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Abstract
Traditional performance evaluation measures do not account for tail events and rare
disasters. To address this issue, we reinterpret the riskiness measures of Aumann
and Serrano (Journal of Political Economy, 2008) and Foster and Hart (Journal of
Political Economy, 2009) as performance indices. We derive the moment properties
of these indices and their sensitivity to rare disasters and show that they are con-
sistent with the asset pricing literature. As applications, we show that anomalous
investment strategies such as momentumor investment in private equity lose much
of their glamour when accounting for high moments and rare events. Furthermore,
using the indices to select mutual funds results in desirable high-moment properties
out of sample.
1. Introduction
Tail risk and rare disasters have been central to the recent meltdown in nancial
markets. Indeed, markets were hit by catastrophic events whose exante probabilities
were considered negligible. Traditional performance evaluation measures (such as the
Sharpe ratio) typically rely on the rst two distribution moments, thereby underesti-
mating the e¤ects of rare disasters. Indeed, low distribution moments hardly account
for rare and catastrophic events, since their large negative e¤ect is multiplied by a
very small probability. By contrast, when one considers high distribution moments,
an extremely negative but rare outcome is raised to a high power, making its e¤ect
on the moment substantial regardless of the small probability associated with it.
High distribution moments have received notable attention in the asset pricing
literature. In particular, a large body of work in asset pricing suggests that investors
favor right skewness (e.g., Rubinstein, 1973; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Jean,
1971; Kane, 1982; Harvey and Siddique, 2000), but are averse to tail-risk and rare
disasters (e.g., Barro, 2006, 2009; Gabaix, 2008, 2012; Gourio, 2012; Chen, Joslin,
and Tran, 2012; Wachter, 2013). It is thus desirable that normative performance
evaluation measures reect these preferences.
In this paper we study two such performance indices relying on a simple reinter-
pretation of the novel riskiness measures proposed by Aumann and Serrano (2008)
and Foster and Hart (2009) (hereafter AS and FH, respectively).1 We investigate
the moment properties of these indices and establish that they reect all distribution
moments in a manner consistent with economic intuition and with the asset pricing
literature. We also discuss the way these two indices reect disaster risk. We then ap-
ply these indices to popular investment strategies and to well-known anomalies, show
their practical usefulness in selecting mutual funds, and demonstrate the pitfalls as-
sociated with ignoring high moments and rare disasters in performance evaluation.
Our starting point is that investors are risk-averse and choose their investments
1Aumann and Serrano (2008) o¤er a set of axioms characterizing the AS riskiness measure. An
axiomatization of the FH measure is o¤ered separately in Foster and Hart (2013).
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by maximizing expected utility. The best possible way to rank investments in this
setup is known to be Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD) (see Hadar and
Russell, 1969; Hanoch and Levy, 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970), according to
which one investment dominates another if all risk-averse investors prefer the former
to the latter. The problem with SOSD is that it only imposes a partial order on
investments. Namely, some pairs of investments cannot be ranked using SOSD.
Based on our discussion thus far, a desirable performance evaluation index should
satisfy the following four requirements: (i) Impose a complete order on investments,
namely, any two investments can be compared; (ii) Depend on the distribution of
outcomes only. That is, the form of the utility function is not needed to calculate
the performance index; (iii) Coincide with SOSD, whenever SOSD can be applied.
Namely, if all risk-averse investors prefer one investment to the other, then the perfor-
mance index ranks the investments accordingly; and (iv) Account for high distribution
moments in a manner consistent with the asset pricing literature. That is, the index
is increasing in mean and skewness and decreasing in variance and tail-risk of the
investment.
The Sharpe ratio, which is probably the most popular performance evaluation
measure, satises (i) and (ii), but clearly fails (iv). Interestingly, it also fails (iii).
Indeed, it is fairly easy to nd examples in which all risk-averse investors prefer one
investment to the other and yet the Sharpe ratio ranks the investments in the wrong
order (see Section 2 for examples). In Appendix B we review several other popular
performance evaluation measures and discuss the extent to which they satisfy these
four requirements.
To understand the fundamental insights in AS and FH it is useful to follow the
approach presented in Hart (2011), who o¤ers a unied framework for the two. The
key for the new indices is to use the investors initial wealth as a benchmark for
her investment decisions. That is, instead of comparing the expected utility of two
investments, we compare the expected utility of each investment separately to the
status quo, and ask which one of the two investments is uniformly rejected more
2
often. If each time that investment g is uniformly rejected we have that investment
g0 is also uniformly rejected, then g is deemed more attractive than g0 (i.e., g has
better performance than g0).2 That is, g is more attractive than g0 if g is rejected
less oftenthan g0 in some uniform manner when compared to the status quo.
The term uniform rejectioncan take two di¤erent meanings. First is wealth-
uniform rejection in which for a given utility function, an investor rejects the in-
vestment relative to the status quo for all wealth levels. Second is utility-uniform
rejectionin which for a given wealth level, all utility functions reject the investment
relative to the status quo. The former approach to uniform rejection leads to the AS
performance index, while the latter leads to the FH performance index.
As shown in AS, FH, and Hart (2011), the two approaches yield two rankings of
investments, each of which can be represented by a positive performance index that
possesses an intuitive economic interpretation. Both indices satisfy requirements (i)
(iii) above. Moreover, they can be easily calculated from the distribution of the
investment by solving an intuitive implicit equation. The only di¤erence between our
interpretation and the interpretations in AS and FH is that they choose to consider
the riskiness of the investment, deeming one investment more risky than another
if it is uniformly rejected more often relative to the status quo. We choose to focus
on the ip side of the argument, viewing one investment as more attractive than
another if it is uniformly rejected less often relative to the status quo. Roughly
speaking, we view an investment as attractive if risk-averse investors show little
aversion to this investment when compared to the status quo, in a uniform manner.
The rst thing we do in this paper is to extend the AS and FH indices to a multi-
period setting. We show that the AS and FH results can readily be considered in
such a setting, and that if gambles are identically distributed in each period, then
the multi-period performance indices coincide with the single-period indices.
We then turn to studying how the AS and FH performance indices are a¤ected
2The term investmenthere simply refers to a random variable which can be described by the
probability distribution over outcomes. We often use the term gamble,which is the one used in
AS and FH, instead. We use the letter g as a generic notation for such investments (or gambles).
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by the moments of the investments being evaluated. We establish that both the AS
and FH indices reect all the distribution moments (raw and central). Moreover,
these performance indices are increasing in all odd moments and decreasing in all
even moments. Consequently, the two indices satisfy requirement (iv) above.
Next, we ask whether the sensitivity of the performance indices to the moments
is monotonically decreasing in the order of the moment. Namely, do high distribu-
tion moments necessarily have a smaller e¤ect on performance than low distribution
moments? We establish that there is no such monotone relation. In particular, the
performance indices can be either more or less sensitive to higher moments. Thus,
high moments can have a material e¤ect on performance, and should not be neglected.
We then turn to exploring how the performance indices are a¤ected by rare disas-
ters, modeled as extremely negative outcomes associated with vanishing probabilities.
First, note that such outcomes tend to make the distribution left skewed (more nega-
tive third moment) and fat-tailed (higher fourth moment). Thus, given requirement
(iv), both performance indices are adversely a¤ected by rare disasters. However, we
show that the FH index is much more sensitive to rare disasters than the AS index.
When making decisions, investors often face exogenous and unavoidable risks
such as macroeconomic shocks and shocks to labor income. This kind of uncertainty
is often termed background risk. In our nal theoretical analysis we study how
such background risk a¤ects the AS and FH indices. We consider two approaches to
modeling background risk. The rst is additive, where exposure to background risk
is modeled by adding a random shock to the investors initial wealth. The second
approach is multiplicative, where the nal wealth of the investor is multiplied by
a random shock. We show that the AS index lends itself naturally to the additive
approach, while the FH index ts well into the multiplicative approach. Furthermore,
we nd that if modeled this way, background risk does not a¤ect the AS and FH
performance indices, and so essentially it could be ignored.
We next turn to exploring the practical implications of the two performance in-
dices. To this end, we show that the two indices lend themselves naturally to es-
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timation using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (see Hansen, 1982).
This approach allows us to test hypotheses regarding the attractiveness of di¤erent
investment strategies in the underlying population of returns.
We rst use the performance indices to evaluate the most prominent and widely
studied investment anomalies: the size anomaly, the value anomaly, and the mo-
mentum anomaly. We compare these investment strategies to each other and to a
naive buy and holdstrategy of investing in the market. We do this by examining
the performance of the four Fama-French factors (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart,
1997). Our most interesting nding here is that the momentum strategy, often con-
sidered the most serious deviation from market e¢ ciency (Fama and French, 1996),
is no longer attractive when accounting for high moments. Momentum returns are
extremely left skewed [as originally pointed out by Harvey and Siddique (2000)] and
fat-tailed, and they exhibit extreme negative events, which fall under our denition of
rare disasters.These high-moment properties outweigh the higher average return
obtained from following momentum. In particular, our estimates of the AS and FH
performance measures show that momentum does not have better performance than
a buy and hold investment in the market. Moreover, we nd that momentum is
dominated by the value anomaly, and it remains dominated even when combined
with other anomalies.
In our next application we compare the performance of private investments to
public equity. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) nd that the returns to pri-
vate equity are not higher than those of public equity. They view this result as
puzzling since private equity investments expose investors to a high level of idiosyn-
cratic risk. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen note that private equity returns are
right skewed and conjecture that preference for skewness may be one reason for the
tendency of individuals to invest in private equity. The indices studied in this paper
are useful for evaluating this statement since they take into account all distribution
moments (skewness among them). Thus, we follow Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002) and compare the returns of public investments to those of private investments
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obtained from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). We nd that the average
return on private equity conditional on survival is about 35 times larger than that of
public equity. Moreover, private equity returns are indeed very right skewed. How-
ever, private equity returns are also extremely more volatile and fat-tailed than the
returns on public equity. The question is then whether the superior rst and third
moments of private equity outweigh its inferior second and fourth moments. Our
estimates of the two indices suggest that this is not the case. Both the AS and FH
indices are signicantly higher for public investments. Thus, based on our estimates,
the private equity premium puzzlesuggested by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002) still stands, and is not resolved by high-moment properties.
In the next application we compare the performance of actively managed equity
funds to that of index funds. The question is whether the returns for actively managed
funds exceed those of passive funds controlling for risk. Given that investors care
about all moments of the return distribution, we extend standard analyses to account
for those moments using the new performance measures. We nd that the moments of
the two management strategies are not materially di¤erent. Moreover, our estimates
show that the performance indices of active vs. passive mutual funds (after accounting
for fees) are not signicantly di¤erent. Thus, the new performance indices reinforce
the view that active management does not improve investment performance (even
when considering high distribution moments).
In our nal analysis we take the two performance indices one step farther. Rather
than just examining the performance of investment strategies, we use the indices to
select among actively managed mutual funds, and examine the performance resulting
from such an investment strategy. If the high-moment properties of investment port-
folios are persistent, then we expect portfolios sorted on the AS and FH measures to
exhibit superior performance out of sample.
To test this, in each month during our sample period of 19672009, we rank all
actively managed equity mutual funds based on their historical AS and FH indices.
We then obtain two portfolios of selected mutual funds by equal-weighting the
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funds in the top decile for each index. We compare these two portfolios to the
market portfolio and to a portfolio selected based on the Sharpe ratio. We nd that
moments generated by the AS and FH indices are signicantly more appealing than
those generated by the Sharpe ratio and are also often more attractive than those of
the market portfolio. In particular, portfolios of mutual funds based on the AS and
FH indices have lower variance, less negative skewness, and lower tail-risk than the
market or the Sharpe ratio-based portfolios. Reecting these observations, both the
AS and FH indices are higher for portfolios which select mutual funds based on these
two indices. This suggests that the two indices may be useful not only for evaluating
investments but also for selecting investments that have desirable moment properties.
Overall, our empirical results demonstrate the importance of high moments in
performance evaluation. What looks like an attractive investment strategy when
focusing on the rst two moments, can easily become less appealing when considering
higher moments and disaster risk. The paper thus contributes to the performance
evaluation literature and to our understanding of the abnormal returns associated
with di¤erent trading strategies. It also contributes to the growing literature which
applies the AS and FH measures. For example, Bakshi, Chabi-Yo, and Gao (2011) use
the Aumann and Serrano (2008) riskiness measure to study how changes in riskiness
over time a¤ect the equity, value, size, and momentum premiums.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents motivating examples. Section 3 in-
troduces the two performance indices. In Section 4 we derive properties of the two
indices. Section 5 discusses practical applications of the indices to di¤erent invest-
ment strategies. Section 6 studies the behavior of mutual fund portfolios selected
using the two indices. We conclude in Section 7. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2. Motivating examples
Before discussing the new performance indices, we consider two examples high-
lighting distributional features that fail to be captured by the Sharpe ratio. We will
show later that the new performance indices successfully incorporate these features.
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The rst example, as shown in Table 1, involves the comparison of two gambles.
Gamble g1 looks like a relatively safe bet. However, it assigns a very small probability
to a rare but disastrous event of losing 10. By contrast, g2 is more volatile than g1:
Yet, the distribution of g2 lies (weakly) to the right of that of g1: Hence, g2 rst-order
stochastically dominates g1. That is, all investors with increasing utility prefer g2 to
g1 (regardless of risk attitude). But, the Sharpe ratio of g1 is higher than that of
g2: This reects the fact that the variance of g1 is very low. In this case, the Sharpe
ratio fails to capture the preference of any reasonable investor.
The problem with the Sharpe ratio is tied closely to the high moments of the
gambles. Notice that both the mean and the variance of g1 are only mildly a¤ected
by the rare disaster. However, higher moments would be more strongly a¤ected by
this event. Indeed, by the way that higher moments are calculated, a disastrous
outcome is raised to a higher and higher power, while the probability associated with
it does not change. As a result, for su¢ ciently high moments, disastrous outcomes
dominate the low probability assigned to them, and hence have a material e¤ect on
the moment itself. Investors maximizing expected utility care about all moments of
the distribution. Hence, disastrous but rare events such as in g1 may have a material
e¤ect on their preferences. In the example above we have calculated the third and
fourth central moments of g1 and g2 for illustration (denoted by m3 and m4). It
can be seen that the third moment of g1 is negative while the third moment of g2 is
positive, reecting the left skewness of g1 compared to g2: And, the fourth moment
of g1 is larger than that of g2; reecting the tail-risk associated with g1: These high
moments are incorporated into the decisions of expected utility maximizers. Our
view is that they should also be incorporated into performance evaluation indices.
One would wonder whether the failure of the Sharpe ratio in the previous example
is driven by the existence of the rare disaster. The second example (presented in Table
2) suggests that it is not the case. In this example, we replace the disastrous event
of g1 by a mild loss of -1. This does not change the fact that gamble g2 rst-order
stochastically dominates g1: Once again, the Sharpe ratio dramatically favors the
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wrong gamble as it is almost 11 times higher for g1 than for g2:We conclude that the
Sharpe ratio may fail to capture the preferences of any reasonable investor even in the
absence of a rare disaster. The calculation of higher moments suggests that despite
the fact that g2 has a higher fourth central moment (m4); it is also right skewed
(reected by a positive m3) as opposed to the left skewness of g1: Thus, the high
fourth moment of g2 is attributed to the right tail. It seems reasonable that these
high-moment properties should also be accounted for in performance evaluation.
3. The performance indices
In this section we rst review and reinterpret relevant results in Aumann and
Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009). To do so, we follow the unied approach
presented in Hart (2011). Then, we extend these results to a multi-period setting.
3.1. One-period gambles
An investment can be modeled as a random variable, which we generically denote
by g: We assume that all moments of g are well dened. Furthermore, we assume
that g has positive expectation and that it admits some negative values with positive
probability. We often refer to g as a gambleand denote the set of all such gambles
by G: For the FH measure only, we also require that g be bounded from below.
We assume that investors have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over
wealth denoted by u () ; which are di¤erentiable as many times as needed. We assume
further that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0; reecting that investors like more wealth over less, and
are strictly risk-averse. Furthermore, we restrict attention to utility functions u sat-
isfying the following three conditions: (i) Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA),
i.e.,  u00(w)u0(w) is weakly decreasing; (ii) Increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), i.e.,
 w u00(w)u0(w) is weakly increasing; and (iii) limw#0 u (w) =  1:We denote the class of all
such utility functions by U; and note that this class includes, for example, all con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions of the form u (w) = w
1 
1  with
  1; as well as utility functions that are constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
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from a su¢ ciently high wealth level on.
Let w0 denote the initial wealth of an investor, to which we refer as her status
quo.
Denition 1. Say that an investor with utility u and initial wealth w0 rejects a gamble
g if E [u (w0 + g)]  u (w0) ; and accepts a gamble g if E [u (w0 + g)] > u (w0) :
That is, an investor rejects a gamble whenever her status quo yields her a weakly
higher expected utility. The following two denitions are needed to describe the
Aumann-Serrano performance index.
Denition 2. Say that a gamble g is wealth-uniformly rejected by an investor with
utility function u; if u rejects g at all initial wealth levels w0.
Intuitively, an investor wealth-uniformly rejects a gamble g; if she prefers the
status quo to g; regardless of her wealth level.
Denition 3. Say that a gamble g wealth-uniformly dominates gamble g0 if when-
ever g is wealth-uniformly rejected by a utility function u, g0 is also wealth-uniformly
rejected by u.
Namely, g wealth-uniformly dominates g0 if whenever an investor with utility
function u prefers the status quo to g for all wealth levels, she also prefers the status
quo to g0 for all wealth levels. In other words, g is preferred to g0; if g0 is more often
wealth-uniformly rejected than g is.
Proposition 1. (Aumann and Serrano, 2008; Hart, 2011). Wealth-uniform domi-
nance induces a complete order on G that extends SOSD. This order can be represented
by a performance index PAS (g) assigned to any gamble g 2 G, which is given by the
unique positive solution to the implicit equation
E

exp
  PAS(g)g = 1: (1)
That is, for any two gambles g and g0; g wealth-uniformly dominates g0 if and only if
PAS (g)  PAS (g0) :
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To gain intuition for the performance index PAS ; it is useful to rewrite (1) as
E
  exp   PAS (g) (w0 + g) =   exp   PAS (g)w0 ; (2)
for some initial wealth w0: Note that (1) and (2) are equivalent regardless of w0:
Thus, a useful interpretation is that PAS (g) is the level of absolute risk aversion that
makes an investor with CARA utility indi¤erent between taking g and the status
quo, regardless of the initial wealth w0: Put di¤erently, an investor with CARA
utility u (w) =   exp ( w), would accept g when  < PAS (g) and would reject g
when   PAS (g) : Thus, a higher level of PAS (g) means that investors are less
averseto g; in the sense that a higher level of risk aversion is needed to reject g: The
key insight in Proposition 1 is that checking (1) is both necessary and su¢ cient for
wealth-uniform dominance for all utilities in U: As such, a higher level of PAS (g)
reects better performance for all utility functions in U in the sense that the gamble
is wealth-uniformly rejected by a smaller set of utility functions.
To understand the source of this insight it is useful to consider a situation in
which there is an upper bound on initial wealth levels denoted by w: Then, since U
only includes DARA utility functions, a gamble g is wealth-uniformly rejected by u
if and only if it is rejected by u at w: Let Au ( w) denote the absolute risk aversion
of u at initial wealth w: Now, PAS (g) is dened as the level of absolute risk aversion
that renders a CARA utility investor indi¤erent between w0 + g and w0 for any w0;
in particular, for w0 = w: Thus, g is wealth-uniformly rejected by u if and only if
Au ( w)  PAS (g) : Consequently, PAS (g1)  PAS (g2) if and only if any time that
g1 is wealth-uniformly rejected, also g2 is wealth-uniformly rejected.
The next denitions are needed to describe the Foster-Hart performance index.
Denition 4. Say that a gamble g is utility-uniformly rejected at an initial wealth
level w0 if all utility functions u 2 U reject g at w0.
That is, a gamble g is utility-uniformly rejected at wealth level w0, if any investor,
regardless of her utility function, prefers the status quo to g at w0.
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Denition 5. Say that a gamble g utility-uniformly dominates gamble g0 if whenever
g is utility-uniformly rejected at an initial wealth level w0 , g0 is also utility-uniformly
rejected at w0.
Namely, g utility-uniformly dominates g0 if whenever all investors with initial
wealth level w0 prefer the status quo to g, they also prefer the status quo to g0.
Roughly, g is preferred to g0; if g0 is more oftenutility-uniformly rejected than g is.
Proposition 2. (Foster and Hart, 2009; Hart, 2011). Utility-uniform dominance
induces a complete order on G that extends SOSD. This order can be represented by
a performance index PFH (g) assigned to any gamble g 2 G, which is given by the
unique positive solution to the implicit equation
E

log
 
1 + PFH(g)g

= 0: (3)
That is, for any two gambles g and g0; g utility-uniformly dominates g0 if and only if
PFH (g)  PFH (g0) :
To gain intuition for the performance index PFH ; it is useful to rewrite (3) as
E

log

1
PFH (g)
+ g

= log

1
PFH (g)

: (4)
That is, 1
PFH(g)
can be interpreted as the level of wealth that would render an investor
with log utility indi¤erent between taking g or staying with the status quo. A log
investor with higher initial wealth than 1
PFH(g)
would accept g; whereas a log investor
with lower initial wealth than 1
PFH(g)
would reject g: Thus, higher PFH corresponds
to better performance in the sense that g is accepted even by individuals with lower
initial wealth. The key insight in Proposition 2 is that checking (3) is both necessary
and su¢ cient for utility-uniform dominance for all initial wealth levels.
To understand this insight recall that U only includes utility functions that
demonstrate IRRA and limw#0 u (w) =  1: These properties imply that the co-
e¢ cient of relative risk aversion of any utility in U must be at least 1. Thus, the
utility with the lowest coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in U is the log utility, which
12
for a xed wealth level also minimizes the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Thus,
a gamble g is utility-uniformly rejected at wealth w0 if and only if it is rejected at
w0 by a log investor. Since PFH (g) is the reciprocal of the wealth level that renders
a log investor indi¤erent between w0 + g and w0; we have that g is utility-uniformly
rejected at w0 if and only if w0  1PFH(g) : Consequently, PFH (g)  PFH (g0) if and
only if whenever g is utility-uniformly rejected, also g0 is utility-uniformly rejected.
It is worth noting that both AS and FH present their measures as riskiness
indices rather than performance indices. However, this is just a matter of in-
terpretation. Their focus is on whether investors are more reluctant to accept one
gamble over another, whereas we adopt the traditional performance measurement
approach in which gambles that investors are more willing to accept receive a higher
score. Given this, the mapping to the original papers (Aumann and Serrano, 2008;
Foster and Hart, 2009; Hart, 2011) is PAS = 1=RAS and PFH = 1=RFH ; where RAS
and RFH are the relevant riskiness measures.
Based on the discussion thus far we conclude that the two performance indices
PAS and PFH satisfy requirements (i)(iii) in the Introduction. In Section 4 we
study the moment properties of the indices and the way they reect disaster risk. In
particular, we establish that they also satisfy requirement (iv).
3.2. Multi-period gambles
In the context of nancial investments it is natural to consider uncertain invest-
ments over time. In this section we extend the measures to a simple multi-period
setting. Let T denote a nite number of periods, and consider a T -period gamble
g =
 
g1; g2; :::gT
 2 GT , where gt 2 G for all t = 1; 2; :::; T: Consider an investor with
a time separable utility function U : RT+ 7 ! R that takes the form
U
 
w1; w2; :::; wT

=
TX
t=1
t 1u
 
wt

; (5)
where u 2 U,  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor, and  w1; w2; :::; wT  denote the wealth
levels consumed by the investor in each of the T periods. The investor is endowed
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with a xed amount w0 at the beginning of each period. To facilitate the analysis,
we assume that the investor consumes her entire wealth at each period. Hence, the
utility of staying with the status quo is equal to
U (w0; w0; :::; w0) = u (w0)
TX
t=1
t 1; (6)
and the expected utility obtained from accepting gamble g is
E

U
 
w0 + g
1; w0 + g
2; :::; w0 + g
T

=
TX
t=1
t 1E

u
 
w0 + g
t

: (7)
The following proposition extends the PAS measure to the multi-period setting.
Proposition 3. Wealth-uniform dominance induces a complete order on GT . This
order can be represented by a performance index PAS (g) assigned to any T -period
gamble g =
 
g1; g2; :::gT
 2 GT , which is given by the unique positive solution to the
implicit equation
TX
t=1
t 1E

exp
  PAS (g)  gt = TX
t=1
t 1: (8)
That is, for any two gambles g and g0; g wealth-uniformly dominates g0 if and only if
PAS (g)  PAS (g0) :
As in the one-period case, PAS can be viewed as the risk aversion level that renders
a CARA investor indi¤erent between taking and rejecting the T -period gamble g:
Unlike in the one-period setting, here PAS depends on the subjective discount factor
: Yet, if all gts are identically distributed, (8) reduces to
E

exp
  PAS(g)gt = 1; (9)
which coincides with the one-period case, and the dependence on  vanishes.
Similarly, for the PFH measure we have
Proposition 4. Utility-uniform dominance induces a complete order on GT . This
order can be represented by a performance index PFH (g) assigned to any T -period
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gamble g =
 
g1; g2; :::gT
 2 GT , which is given by the unique positive solution to the
implicit equation
TX
t=1
t 1E

log
 
1 + PFH(g)gt

= 0: (10)
That is, for any two gambles g and g0; g utility-uniformly dominates g0 if and only if
PFH (g)  PFH (g0) :
As in the one-period case, the PFH (g) measure can be viewed as the reciprocal of
the critical wealth level at which a log investor would be indi¤erent between taking
and not taking gamble g: In particular, if all gts are identically distributed, (10)
reduces to the one-period version, i.e.,
E

log
 
1 + PFH(g)gt

= 0: (11)
The next proposition studies the dependence of the performance measures on the
subjective discount factor . For convenience, we assume T = 2:
Proposition 5. For any g =
 
g1; g2
 2 G2 and P = PAS or P = PFH ; @P (g)@ has
the same sign as P
 
g2
  P  g1 :
The intuition is clear. When g2 is a better gamble than g1 in the sense that
P
 
g2

> P
 
g1

; the two-period gamble
 
g1; g2

becomes more favorable when  is
higher, i.e., when more weight is assigned to g2:
4. Properties of the performance indices
In this section we study the moment properties of the performance indices, their
sensitivity to rare disasters, the e¤ect of scale, leverage, and diversication on perfor-
mance, and the e¤ect of background risk. For brevity we only consider the one-period
setting in this section. All of the results apply also to the multi-period setting.
4.1. Basic moment properties of the performance indices
For any gamble g 2 G, let n (g) = E [gn] be the nth raw moment of g (n  1
an integer) and let mn (g) = E [(g   1 (g))n] be the nth central moment of g (n 
2 an integer). Since g 2 G, all these moments exist.
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Any two gambles may di¤er in several of their moments. To get a basic under-
standing of how di¤erent moments are related to the performance indices, it is useful
to consider the hypothetical exercise of changing one moment at a time while keeping
all other moments xed. For example, one can think of two investment opportunities
that have identical moments except that the returns of one are more skewed than the
returns of the other (higher third moment). How does this a¤ect the performance
indices of the two investments?
To see how the moments of a gamble a¤ect its performance indices we consider
rst the PAS index. Start by rewriting Eq. (1) as a Taylor expansion around zero:
1X
n=1
( 1)n
n!
 
PAS (g)
n
n (g) = 0: (12)
Thus, PAS (g) is given implicitly by the sum of a power series with coe¢ cients pro-
portional to the raw moments of the distribution of g: Odd moments are assigned
negative weights, while even moments are assigned positive weights. A similar rela-
tion can be written with the central moments using a Taylor series around 1 (g):
1 +
1X
n=2
( 1)n
n!
 
PAS (g)
n
mn (g) = exp
 
PAS (g)1 (g)

: (13)
In the next proposition we use these representations to show that the PAS measure
is increasing in all odd moments (both raw and central) and decreasing in all even
moments (both raw and central).
Proposition 6. Consider two gambles g; g0 2 G and let k be a positive integer.
1. Assume that for all n 6= k; n (g) = n (g0) but k (g) > k (g0) : Then,
PAS (g) > PAS (g0) if k is odd, while PAS (g) < PAS (g0) if k is even.
2. Assume that 1 (g) = 1 (g
0) and that for all n 6= k; mn (g) = mn (g0) but
mk (g) > mk (g
0) : Then, PAS (g) > PAS (g0) if k is odd, while PAS (g) <
PAS (g0) if k is even.
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Next we consider the PFH measure following the same approach as above. Start
by rewriting Eq. (3) as a Taylor expansion around zero:
1X
n=1
( 1)n 1
n
 
PFH (g)
n
n (g) = 0: (14)
Notice that this Taylor expansion converges only when  1 < PFH (g) g  1 for all
realizations of g: As before, the PFH index is also given implicitly by the sum of a
power series with coe¢ cients proportional to the raw moments of the distribution of
g: However, odd moments are now assigned positive weights, whereas even moments
are assigned negative weights. A similar relation can be written with the central
moments using a Taylor series around 1 (g):
log
 
1 + PFH(g)1(g)

=
1X
n=2
( 1)n
n

PFH(g)
1 + PFH(g)1(g)
n
mn(g): (15)
This expansion converges for all g 2 G such that 1 < PFH (g) g  1+2PFH (g)1(g):
The next proposition shows that the PFH measure is also increasing (decreasing)
in all odd (even) raw and central moments.
Proposition 7. Consider two gambles g; g0 2 G and let k be some positive integer.
1. Assume that for all n 6= k; n (g) = n (g0) but k (g) > k (g0) : Suppose that
 1 < PFH (g) g  1: Then, PFH (g) > PFH (g0) if k is odd, while PFH (g) <
PFH (g0) if k is even.
2. Assume that 1 (g) = 1 (g
0) and that for all n 6= k; mn (g) = mn (g0) but
mk (g) > mk (g
0) : Suppose that  1 < PFH (g) g  1 + 2PFH (g)1 (g) : Then,
PFH (g) > PFH (g0) if k is odd, while PFH (g) < PFH (g0) if k is even.
A caveat is that unlike the PAS measure, the moment properties for the PFH
measure only apply when the gamble is bounded from both below and above. When
these conditions are not satised, the moment properties for the PFH measure dis-
cussed in this section may not apply.
Propositions 6 and 7 tell us among other things that PAS and PFH are increasing
in the mean and decreasing in the variance of a gamble, which is consistent with
17
traditional performance measures, in particular, the Sharpe ratio. In fact, it is shown
in Aumann and Serrano (2008) that when a gamble g has a normal distribution,
PAS(g) = 21 (g) =m2 (g) : That is, in the normal case the P
AS index is proportional
to a mean-to-variance ratio. For general distributions, both indices admit larger
values when the third moment is large and when the fourth moment is small. Thus,
requirement (iv) is satised by both indices.
4.2. Magnitude of the moment e¤ects
Having established the basic moment properties, we now turn to studying the
magnitude of their e¤ects. While it has been increasingly acknowledged that higher
moments play an important role in performance evaluation, standard performance
indices often do not account for these aspects. For example, the widely used Sharpe
ratio does not account for moments above the second, implicitly assuming that they
should be assigned a negligible weight in the performance measure. It is interesting to
examine whether the weight assigned to the di¤erent moments in the new performance
indices is monotonically decreasing in the order of the moment.
A di¢ culty in examining the relative importance of the moments is that each
moment is stated in a di¤erent unit of measurement. For example, suppose that the
rst moment (the mean) is measured in percentage points, then the second moment
is measured in percentage points squared, etc. To account for this fact and allow for
a faircomparison, we examine the magnitude e¤ects of the normalized moments
^k  kpk for k = 1; 2; ::: and m^k  k
p
mk for k = 2; 3; :::, since all of these have
the same units of measurement as the gamble itself. For example, while m2 is the
variance of the gamble, m^2 is the standard deviation. Note that moments of degree
k are homogeneous of degree k; while all normalized moments are homogeneous of
degree 1. Additionally, both PAS and PFH are homogeneous of degree -1.3
To gauge the inuence of a moment on the performance index, we calculate the
elasticity of the index with respect to normalized moments. This gives us a unit
3A real function h () is homogeneous of degree k if h (tx) = tkh (x) for all x and t > 0:
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freeestimate of the sensitivity. Since we are focusing on the magnitude of the e¤ects
rather than their directions (which we have established already), we only consider the
absolute values of these elasticities (which we term absolute elasticities). We begin
with studying the absolute elasticity of PAS and PFH with respect to ^k; which we
denote by ASk and 
FH
k ; respectively.
Consider the PAS measure rst. For all g 2 G, implicitly di¤erentiating (12)
yields
ASk (g) 
@PAS@^k  ^kPAS (g)
 = 1(k 1)!(PAS(g))k jk (g)jP1
n=1
( 1)n
(n 1)! (P
AS(g))n n (g)
: (16)
Note that ASk is homogeneous of degree 0. This follows because k is homogeneous
of degree k and PAS is homogeneous of degree -1. Hence,
ASk (g) = 
AS
k
 
PASg

=
1
(k 1)!
k  PASgP1
n=1
( 1)n
(n 1)!n (P
ASg)
: (17)
This normalization allows us to compare the e¤ect of di¤erent moments on the per-
formance measure by taking the ratios of the absolute elasticities for di¤erent levels
of k: Specically,
ASk+1 (g)
ASk (g)
=
1
k!
k+1  PASg
1
(k 1)! jk (PASg)j
(18)
=
1
k
^k+1  PASg
 ^k+1  PASg
j^k (PASg)j
!k
:
If this elasticity ratio takes a value greater than 1, then the (k + 1)th moment has a
greater e¤ect on the performance measure than the kth moment. On the other hand,
a ratio less than 1 implies that the PAS measure is less sensitive to the (k + 1)th
moment as compared to the kth moment:
To understand the forces that drive this elasticity ratio to be higher or lower than
1, note rst that it consists of three components: the factor 1k ; ^k+1
 
PASg

; and the
ratio of ^k+1
 
PASg

to ^k
 
PASg

raised to the kth power. First, for all k  1; we
have that 1k  1; which drives down the elasticity ratio, and thus the importance of
higher moments.
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The second component,
^k+1  PASg can be higher or lower than 1 and so can
either strengthen or weaken the importance of higher moments. Third and perhaps
most interesting is that the third factor introduces a force always making higher
moments more important. To see this, note that by Hölders inequality,
^k+1
 
PAS jgj  ^k  PAS jgj : (19)
This implies that when k is an odd number, ^k+1
 
PASg

^k (P
ASg)

k
 1: (20)
And, when k is even,  
^k+2
 
PASg

^k (P
ASg)
!k
 1: (21)
Thus, the third factor is necessarily greater than 1 for odd values of k: And, for even
values of k; we still have a trend up when comparing the (k+2)th to the kth moment.
To summarize, somewhat surprisingly, we do not nd that higher moments neces-
sarily have a weaker e¤ect on performance evaluation. Rather, we see forces in either
direction. In Section 5 we illustrate this point, showing that higher moments often
have a signicant e¤ect.
Similarly, for any gamble g 2 G such that  1 < PFH (g) g  1, we can calculate
the absolute elasticity of PFH with respect to ^k. The resulting elasticity ratio is
given by
FHk+1 (g)
FHk (g)
=
^k+1  PFHg
 ^k+1  PFHg
j^k (PFHg)j
!k
: (22)
Note that compared to the case with the PAS measure, the elasticity ratio for the
PFH measure only has two components, which correspond to the second and third
factors in the PAS case. In particular, now we lose the rst factor 1k ; which serves
as a depreciating component in the PAS case. Therefore, the force driving up the
importance of higher moments is even stronger with the PFH index.
The discussion above considers the magnitude of the moment e¤ects with respect
to raw moments. Similar results are obtained with respect to central moments. We
denote such elasticities by ASk (g) and 
FH
k (g) : For brevity we omit this analysis.
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4.2.1. Example: a shifted lognormal distribution
To illustrate the magnitudes of the moment properties and how they a¤ect per-
formance evaluation, consider the following example related to the PFH measure.
Let x  N  x0; 2 be a normal variable and consider the shifted lognormal gamble
g = exp (x) exp (x0) : It is easily veried that PFH (g) = exp ( x0) : Hence, PFH (g)
depends only on x0 but not on 2: Intuitively, 2 a¤ects all distribution moments
but does not a¤ect PFH since the e¤ects on the di¤erent moments o¤set each other.
Moreover, calculation shows that FH1 (g) = 1 and 
FH
2 (g) > 1: Thus, if we would
increase only the rst moment by 1%, performance would improve by 1%. And, if
we would increase only the second moment by 1%, then performance would decline
by more than 1%. Also, calculation shows that if 2 is su¢ ciently high, then both
FH3 (g) and 
FH
4 (g) become larger than 1, and in fact diverge to innity as 
2 di-
verges. Thus, higher distribution moments in this example can have a strong e¤ect
on performance.
4.3. Rare disasters
4.3.1. E¤ect of rare disasters on performance
In some cases gambles feature very bad events that occur with a very small prob-
ability. As discussed in Section 2, small probability events are not likely to a¤ect low
moments, but may become dominant when high moments are taken into account.
Thus, the measures discussed here are well suited to reect such events. In fact, the
two measures di¤er in the way they account for rare disasters.
An important property of the PFH measure is that it is extremely sensitive to rare
disasters [see the discussion in Section V.B in Foster and Hart (2009)]. To formalize
this property in our context, let g0 2 G be a gamble and choose L > 0 very large. One
can think of g0 as a business as usualgamble that involves some gains and losses
but no disastrous events, whereas  L is a very big and unusual loss. Then, consider
the composite gamble g that assigns probability 1  to g0 and  to  L; where  is
some small probability. The gamble g reects both business-as-usualrealizations
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and the rare disaster. As  becomes very small, the PFH index becomes completely
dominated by the disastrous loss L: Namely, lim!0 PFH (g) = 1=L: Formally,
Proposition 8. Let g0 2 G be a gamble and L > 0 such that PFH (g0) > 1=L: Let
 2 (0; 1) and let g denote a composite gamble that assigns probability 1    to g0
and  to  L: Then, lim!0 PFH (g) = 1=L:4
This follows intuitively from (4). Indeed, the argument of the log function can-
not be negative, and thus regardless of the probability assigned to the disaster  L;
we have PFH < 1L : When the probability of the rare disaster becomes small, this
inequality becomes more and more binding, as the e¤ect of the business as usual
gamble g0 becomes prominent. Thus, with rare disasters the wealth level of a log
investor needed to accept the gamble is roughly equal to the worst-case loss, and the
PFH measure is roughly equal to 1L :
It is important to note that a corresponding result does not hold for the PAS index.
In fact, the continuity property in Aumann and Serrano (2008, p. 819) implies that
lim!0 PAS (g) = PAS (g0) whenever fgg are uniformly bounded. In Section 5 we
illustrate that indeed, the PFH index is much more sensitive to isolated bad events
than the PAS index.
4.3.2. Modeling rare disasters
Measuring, modeling, and estimating rare disasters in practice is a challenge since,
by denition, data on such events are scarce. One approach is to consider a single
low and rare outcome as a rare disaster. For example, Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012)
model a rare disaster in consumption by taking a single value that matches the
calibration of Barro (2006). An alternative approach is to use a distribution of disaster
sizes. For example, Barro and Jin (2011) use a power law distribution to model the
left tail of both consumption and gross domestic product (GDP).
4 It is implicit in the statement of the theorem that the sequence fgg is convergent. Note also
that since g0 2 G, we have that E (g0) > 0: It follows that for all  in a right neighborhood of 0,
E (g) > 0 and thereby, g 2 G and PFH (g) is well dened.
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These two approaches have implications for performance evaluation using PAS
and PFH . On one hand consider a single disaster  L; and on the other hand replace
 L with a distribution that has mean  L: Then, conditional on being in the left tail,
the latter case imposes a mean-preserving spread relative to the former. By Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1970), a mean-preserving spread implies second-order stochastic
dominance. Thereby, we have the following corollary of Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. Both PAS and PFH favor a gamble with a single disaster  L over a
gamble with a distribution of disasters with mean  L:
Thus, using a single disaster size set at the mean of the disaster distribution
results in improved performance. But, if the single disaster size is set to be lower
than the mean of the disaster distribution, then the performance ranking between
the two cases is no longer clear, and it depends on the choice of parameter values.
We provide an example in Section 5.3.
4.4. Scale, leverage, and diversication
In applying the two indices one should use caution when dealing with the scale of
the gamble and with leverage. To see this point consider a gamble g; and scale it up
to g with  > 1: The homogeneity of the indices implies that P (g) = 1P (g) <
P (g) :5 This is a simple reection of the fact that if g is rejected by a risk-averse
individual compared to the status quo, then g must also be rejected. Indeed, x
any increasing and concave utility u: Then, by Jensens inequality for every  > 1;
E [u (w0 + g)]  u (w0)  1
  1 (E [u (w0 + g)] E [u (w0 + g)]) : (23)
Hence, if g is rejected (i.e., E [u (w0 + g)]  u (w0)), then also g is rejected (since
E [u (w0 + g)]  E [u (w0 + g)]  u (w0)). In words, a scaled up version of a rejected
gamble cannot be accepted by a risk-averse investor.
Similarly, if there exists a risk-free asset with return rf > 0, we can consider the
5Any time we use P it means that the statement applies to both PAS and PFH :
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gamble g + (1  ) rf ; assuming it is in G: Then for  > 1;
P (g + (1  ) rf )  P (g) : (24)
This again reects that any time a risk-averse individual rejects a gamble g (compared
to the status quo), she also rejects a levered version of that gamble. Indeed, we
already know that P (g) < P (g) : Then, (24) follows immediately from the fact that
g+(1  ) rf is rst-order stochastically dominated by g. Given this, for practical
applications of the indices it may make sense to compare gambles that have the same
scale and leverage. We follow this approach in Section 5.
Finally, we have so far restricted attention to choosing one of two gambles. In
practice, there could be multiple gambles available for investment, and an investor
may be allowed to invest in a portfolio of gambles. The following proposition estab-
lishes that according to the PAS and PFH measures, diversication always (weakly)
improves value and that a unique optimal portfolio of any two gambles exists. This
follows from convexity properties of the original AS and FH risk measures.
Proposition 9. Let g1; g2 2 G be two di¤erent bounded gambles such that g1 +
(1  ) g2 2 G for all  2 [0; 1] : Then, there exists a unique ^AS (^FH) 2 [0; 1] that
maximizes PAS (PFH) over all convex combinations of g1 and g2.
4.5. Background risk
When investors make decisions, they often face exogenous and unavoidable risks.
For example, an investor choosing among di¤erent mutual funds may face uncertainty
regarding ination or her labor income. This kind of uncertainty is typically termed
background risk. It is important to know whether our results are sensitive to the
presence of such risks. This section explores this issue.
We consider two approaches to modeling background risk. First is additive
background risk following Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (1996), who note
that exposure to background risk can be modeled as adding a random shock to the
investors initial wealth. Another approach consists of multiplicative background
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risk,where the nal wealth of the investor is multiplied by a random shock. The
additive approach may t a shock to the investors endowment such as due to labor
income, whereas the multiplicative approach may t a random shock to the entire
macroeconomic environment, e.g., due to ination. The PAS measure lends itself
naturally to the additive framework, while the PFH measure ts naturally into the
multiplicative approach.6 We discuss each of them separately.
4.5.1. Background risk and the AS measure
Assume that the investor has utility function u () and initial wealth w0: In addi-
tion, assume that the investor faces background risk captured by a random variable
y; which is independent from any gamble to be considered. The investor needs to
determine whether to accept gamble g or not. If she chooses not to take the gamble,
then her expected utility is E [u (w0 + y)] : Alternatively, if she accepts the gamble,
her expected utility becomes E [u (w0 + y + g)] :
For any given utility u and background risk y; we dene a new utility function v
by v (w;u; y) = E [u (w + y)] : Note that if u () is increasing and concave then so is
v (;u; y) : Thus, for a given background risk y we can consider the notion of wealth-
uniform rejection with respect to utilities of the form v (;u; y) : A di¢ culty is that in
general, u 2 U does not imply v 2 U:7 Nevertheless, the results related to the PAS
measure only require weak DARA, with CARA being a special case [see the proof of
Theorem 1 in Hart (2011)]. Let UD denote the set of all utility functions satisfying
weak DARA. We can show that if u 2 UD; then also v (;u; y) 2 UD: This enables us
to establish the following result.
6The reason for this distinction is related to the properties of the exponential and log utility
functions. An additive shock can be separated from the wealth of an investor with CARA utility,
which serves as a tool for the PAS measure calculation. Similarly, a multiplicative shock can be
separated from the wealth of an investor with log utility, which serves as a tool for the PFH measure
calculation. These separation properties facilitate the generalization of the measures to allow for
background risk.
7For example, note that log (w + k) does not satisfy IRRA for k negative. Thus, if we set u (w) =
log (w) and consider a sequence of background noises fyng that converges in distribution to the
constant k < 0; then vn (w) = E [u (w + yn)] fails IRRA for n large enough.
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Proposition 10. Consider an additive background risk y. Gamble g wealth-uniformly
dominates gamble g0 if and only if PAS (g)  PAS (g0) ; where the wealth-uniform
dominance order is dened over utility functions of the form v (;u; y) where u 2 UD.
This proposition tells us that if investors have weak DARA utility, then additive
background risk does not a¤ect their investment rankings when it comes to the PAS
measure. Thus, additive background risk can be ignored when using the PAS measure.
4.5.2. Background risk and the FH measure
A multiplicative model of background risk can be obtained by multiplying the
nal wealth of the investor with a random shock 1 + z  0. Thus, for any given
utility u and background risk 1+z; we dene a new utility function v by v (w;u; z) =
E [u (w (1 + z))] : Note that if u () is increasing and concave, then so is v (;u; z) :We
can then consider the notion of utility-uniform rejection applied to utility functions
of the form v (;u; z) : As before, u 2 U does not necessarily imply v 2 U: However,
to establish our results related to the PFH measure, it is su¢ cient to consider utility
functions with relative risk aversion weakly larger than 1, which naturally includes
log utility [see the proof of Theorem 1 in Hart (2011), and in particular, Remark (1)
on p. 637]. Let UI denote the set of all utility functions with relative risk aversion
being at least 1. We can show that if u 2 UI ; then also v (;u; z) 2 UI : This facilitates
the following result.
Proposition 11. Consider a multiplicative background risk 1 + z. Gamble g utility-
uniformly dominates gamble g0 if and only if PFH (g)  PFH (g0) ; where the utility-
uniform dominance order is dened over utility functions of the form v (;u; z) where
u 2 UI .
Thus, if investors have relative risk aversion weakly larger than 1, multiplicative
background risk does not a¤ect their investment rankings using the PFH measure,
and hence could be ignored.
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5. Applications
Having established the properties of the indices, we now study several applica-
tions. We rst discuss how the indices can be estimated empirically, and then provide
several settings in which the indices are used to draw conclusions about the attractive-
ness of di¤erent investment strategies. The high-moment and rare disaster properties
play an important role in these analyses.
5.1. Estimation method
5.1.1. Using return data
In most applications the theoretical notion of a gamble will be represented
by a nite sample of T return observations, reecting the percentage change in the
investment of the agent. To be consistent we assume that all investments are of $100,
which allows us to treat the percentage rates of return as the actual wealth changes.
Additionally, note that the performance measures do not explicitly account for
the opportunity cost of investing in a particular gamble. Thus, in each case we need
to specify what we view is the right opportunity cost. For example, in the case of
investing in the security market one can view the opportunity cost as investing in a
risk-free asset. In that case, the gamble that should be evaluated is that of borrowing
$100 at the risk-free rate and investing this amount in the market. Thus, the returns
to be evaluated are, in fact, the excess returns (returns less risk-free rate). Di¤erent
cases we analyze below will be associated with di¤erent natural opportunity costs.
5.1.2. Statistical estimation of the measures
Consider a nite sample of T return observations. As usual in the performance
evaluation literature, we assign each observation a probability of 1T : Then, we estimate
PAS and PFH by solving the implicit equations (1) and (3). Typically, we view the
nite sample as a random sample from a population of returns. Then, PAS and PFH
which we calculate are just the sample estimates of the trueperformance indices.
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To answer questions regarding the underlying population, we apply the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) (see Hansen, 1982). GMM works out a distribution for
the parameter estimates, and, in particular, generates standard errors that we can use
to test hypotheses. This approach is natural since (1) and (3) can directly be viewed
as moment conditions, and thus lend themselves easily to GMM estimation.8 Notice
that in either case, we have exactly one parameter to be estimated and one moment
condition, implying that our problem is just identied,and the GMM estimate is
determined such that the sample average of the moment condition equals zero. Thus,
the GMM estimates equal the solutions to the implicit equations (1) and (3). These
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal. Moreover, since the model is
just identied, the weighting matrix used for the GMM estimation is irrelevant, and
the estimates are e¢ cient. We also obtain a covariance matrix, which yields standard
errors that allow us to examine the statistical signicance of the measures.
Often we compare the performance indices for multiple gambles to assess which
investment strategy dominates. We then estimate the performance indices jointly.
That is, we estimate the performance indices of n gambles using the n moment
conditions implied by the implicit equations (1) (or (3)). The resulting covariance
matrix allows us to compute a standard error for the di¤erence in the measures of
any two gambles, which can then be used to determine whether the gambles generate
signicantly di¤erent performance indices in the population.
To be consistent with the estimation of the performance indices, we also use the
GMM approach to estimate various moments of gambles. It is worth noting that the
GMM estimates of central moments are biased, but this has a negligible e¤ect on our
results due to the consistency of the estimates.
8Bali, Cakici, and Chabi-Yo (2011) o¤er an alternative way to estimate the measures using option
prices. Such an approach may be applied for assets with available liquid options. Note also that
their calculations of the risk measures apply risk-neutral probabilities, although the measures are
stated in terms of physical probabilities. Thus, their calculations tend to overweight the probabilities
of bad outcomes, essentially correcting for risk twice. Advantages of the GMM approach proposed
here is its wide applicability, the fact that it allows one to test hypotheses, and its direct reliance on
physical probabilities.
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5.2. Application I: attractiveness of anomalies
As a rst application of the indices, we evaluate the attractiveness of popular
investment strategies that rely on well-documented anomalies. It is well established
that small rms (those with low market capitalizations), and value rms (those with
high book-to-market ratios) gain abnormal average returns in US equity markets
(see Banz, 1981; Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Fama and French, 1992).
Additionally, it is established that momentum strategies, i.e., holding long positions
in stocks that yielded high returns in the recent past while holding a short position
in stocks that yielded low returns in the recent past, generate abnormal returns
(see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Are these trading strategies still attractive when
accounting for their high-moment properties?
To evaluate this issue we use the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997)
portfolios, which are constructed based on these anomalies. Specically, Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) construct four portfolios. The rst is denoted
mktrf (for market less the risk-free rate). The returns for this portfolio reect an
investment in a well-diversied portfolio of US stocks, where the opportunity cost is
assumed to be investment in a risk-free asset. The second portfolio is smb (for small
minus big). This portfolio is long in low market-capitalization stocks and short in high
market-capitalization stocks. Historically, this portfolio yielded abnormal returns
reecting what is known as the small rm anomaly. Note that the underlying
assumption here is that the opportunity cost of investing in small stocks is the return
of investing in large stocks. The third portfolio is hml (for high minus low). This
portfolio is long in high book-to-market stocks (value stocks) and short in low book-
to-market stocks (growth stocks). This portfolio builds on the value anomaly.The
fourth portfolio is umd (for up minus down). This portfolio is long in stocks that had
high returns in the recent past (winners) and short in stocks that had low returns in
the recent past (losers), building on the momentum anomaly.
We obtain monthly data for the four portfolios for the period January 1962 to
December 2009 from Kenneth Frenchs data library. Panel A of Table 3 reports
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summary statistics for the rst moment (1) and the three higher central moments
(m2; m3; and m4) for the four portfolios. The table also compares the moments for
the di¤erent portfolios using GMM standard errors.
The average monthly market excess return (mktrf) during our sample period is
0.41%, the average monthly return on the smb portfolio is 0.23%, and the average
monthly returns on the hml and umd portfolios are 0.44% and 0.73%, respectively.
These averages are consistent with prior studies, and reect the popular attractiveness
of the value (hml) and momentum (umd) anomalies. In terms of higher moments
we see that mktrf has the highest variance (m2), while umd is the most negatively
skewed and exhibits the largest tail-risk (m4) out of the four portfolios. Fig. 1
presents histograms of the returns of the four portfolios. One interesting feature that
can be learned from this gure is that the umd portfolio has some extreme and rare
bad events. These rare disasters contribute to the high tail-risk associated with
this strategy and perhaps also to the left skewness.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the Sharpe ratios and the PAS and PFH performance
indices.9 The Sharpe ratio of the umd portfolio appears to be the highest among
the four, with the Sharpe ratio of the smb the lowest, although the di¤erences are
not statistically signicant. Both the PAS and PFH measures, however, suggest that
hml is the superior portfolio. Apparently, the high negative skewness and tail-risk of
umd lower its attractiveness. Indeed, comparing the umd and hml portfolios, we see
that the former has more negative skewness ( 116:1 vs.  0:67) and higher tail-risk
(4,862.9 vs. 390.8). Thus, despite the fact that the Sharpe ratio of umd is slightly
higher than that of hml; the PAS and PFH measures favor hml:
It is interesting to note that the negative rare events showing in the distribution
of umd play an important role in the determination of PFH . Recall from Proposition
8 that in the presence of a rare disaster, we have PFH  1L , where L is the loss
in the case of the disaster. In the case of umd; Fig. 1 shows a disaster returnof
9We estimate Sharpe ratios and their associated standard errors following Lo (2002). This is
achieved by applying the delta method based on the GMM estimates of the mean and the variance
of the portfolio returns.
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-34.7%. This reects the return on momentum investing in April 2009, during which
the market experienced a sharp reversal. Accordingly, we have that PFH for the umd
portfolio is 134:7  0:029: Thus, in the case of umd; the rare disaster dominates the
performance measurement of the portfolio, when using PFH .
Panel B of Table 3 also reports the elasticities, which reect the importance of the
di¤erent moments in the determination of the performance measures (as discussed
in Section 4.2). Recall, in particular, that the importance of the moments may or
may not be monotone. Thus, higher moments can potentially be very inuential
in determining performance. The elasticities reported in the table suggest that the
rst two moments have a strong e¤ect on performance of the four portfolios. The
elasticities of the third and fourth moments are lower but still meaningful. And, as
suggested in Section 4.2, the elasticities are often non-monotone. For example, for
the PAS measure of the hml portfolio, the fourth moment has a roughly 20 times
larger elasticity compared to the third moment, due to the very small skewness of
this portfolio. Note that in the case of the PFH measure of the umd portfolio, all
reported elasticities are very small. This is a reection of the fact that in this case
the PFH measure is dominantly determined by the rare disaster.
Panel B also reports the certainty equivalent of a risk-averse investor with CRRA
utility given by u (w) = w
1 
1  : For illustration we use  = 3; 5; 10; which are levels
of risk aversion commonly used in asset pricing calibrations. In addition, we set
the initial wealth and the scale of investment to be equal. For example, the results
suggest that when  = 5; investments in the mktrf and smb portfolios are equivalent
to certain -0.14% and  0:02% monthly losses, while investments in the hml and umd
portfolios are equivalent to certain 0.23% and 0.14% monthly gains, respectively.
However, the di¤erences in the certainty equivalent for the four portfolios are not
statistically signicant in most cases. Also notice that the hml portfolio becomes
more attractive relative to the umd portfolio as the level of risk aversion increases.
In Section 4.4 we have established that diversication improves performance ac-
cording to both PAS and PFH , and that for any two gambles there exists a unique
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convex combination that maximizes each of the performance measures (Proposition
9). To illustrate this result we now study how combinations of the four Fama-French
and Carhart portfolios a¤ect their attractiveness. Specically, for each pair of the
four portfolios, we numerically nd the optimal weight maximizing PAS and PFH .
The results are reported in Table 4, in which for each pair of portfolios we report the
maximal performance and the associated optimal weights (in parentheses).
As expected, the performance measures for the optimal convex combinations are
always higher than those for the associated stand aloneportfolios. For example,
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the PAS measures for the mktrf and smb portfolios
are 0.0382 and 0.0468, respectively. In comparison, the optimal convex combination
consisting of 35% invested in mktrf and 65% invested in smb has a PAS value of
0.0659, which is more than 40% higher than the individual performances. The best
pairwise performance according to both measures is achieved by mixing between smb
and hml: Specically, the optimal combination for the PAS measure is obtained by
investing 43% in smb and 57% in hml, which delivers a PAS value of 0.2006. In
comparison, if one mixes between hml and umd; then the maximal PAS value is
0.1933. Similarly, the optimal combination for the PFH measure consists of 54% and
46% invested in smb and hml, respectively. The associated maximal PFH value is
equal to 0.1540, which is higher than 0.1143, the maximal PFH value achieved by
mixing between hml and umd:
In summary, the discussion in this section illustrates that high moments and rare
disasters may have a meaningful e¤ect on the performance evaluation of popular
trading strategies. In particular, the popular momentum strategy appears much less
attractive using the new performance indices. Indeed, this strategy has high negative
skewness, high tail-risk, and it exhibits rare disasters, all of which tend to lower its
PAS and PFH performance indices. In addition, the momentum strategy remains
dominated even after allowing for diversication between di¤erent anomalies.
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5.3. Application II: more on the importance of high moments and rare disas-
ters
In this section we demonstrate further the importance of high moments in evalu-
ating the performance of investment portfolios. To illustrate this point we rst use
the momentum (umd) portfolio presented above. We ask the following question: To
what extent would performance evaluation be biased if we accounted for the rst two
moments only, essentially ignoring the e¤ects of higher moments? To answer this
question we draw one million samples of 576 realizations (same size as the umd sam-
ple) from a simulated normal distribution with mean and variance equal to those of
the sample momentum returns. We also draw one million samples with replacement
from the original umd portfolio return distribution. Fig. 2 shows the distributions
of the umd portfolio and one arbitrary sample simulated using the normal distribu-
tion. It appears that the simulated version of umd is less left skewed and does not
su¤er from rare disasters. To formally compare the two distributions, we calculate
bootstrapped standard errors for the two sets of samples.10
Panel A of Table 5 reports the moments of the true and simulated umd distribu-
tions. Observe that the rst two moments are very close (as expected). The higher
moments look quite di¤erent. For example, the fourth moment of umd is 4,863 com-
pared to 1,055 for the simulated distribution. However, the bootstrapped standard
errors are quite large, and we cannot reject the null that the two are statistically
equal. Panel B of Table 5 reports the Sharpe ratio and the PAS and PFH perfor-
mance indices. The Sharpe ratio is close for the true and simulated portfolios, which
is expected as both portfolios have similar mean and variance. The PAS index is
lower for the umd portfolio as compared to the simulated one (0.063 vs. 0.078),
although the di¤erence is not statistically signicant. The PFH index signicantly
favors the simulated normal distribution, as it is about 2.3 times higher than that
for the umd portfolio (signicant at the 1% level). The di¤erence in the PFH indices
10One could alternatively use our GMM standard errors in this case. None of the conclusions
below depends on this choice.
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comes largely from the existence of a rare disasterfor the umd portfolio. In sum,
this example shows that relying on the rst two moments only may lead one astray.
We next illustrate how di¤erent approaches to modeling rare disasters can a¤ect
performance evaluation. Section 4.3.2 discussed two such modeling approaches: (i)
using a single disaster size; or (ii) applying a distribution of rare disasters. To con-
struct a parametric example, we apply these two approaches to the Fama-French and
Carhart factor portfolios.
For each portfolio we dene monthly return realizations falling below the 1%
quantile as rare disasters. In other words, these disastrousevents occur about once
every 8.3 years. The values of these disaster thresholds in our sample are -11.8%,
-6.8%, -8.5%, and -11.6% for mktrf; smb; hml; and umd; respectively. We then
calculate for each portfolio the average disaster size conditional on the occurrence
of a disastrous event. These averages in our sample are -15.9%, -9.5%, -9.9%, and
-19.0% for mktrf; smb; hml; and umd; respectively. Next, we compare the PAS and
PFH measures for the following two scenarios. In one scenario, the measures are
computed using the original sample returns, which is exactly what we did before. In
another, we replace all disastrous realizations by the single average disaster size. As
expected from Corollary 1, both measures are higher in the case of single disaster size.
The di¤erence is statistically insignicant in most cases, but it is both economically
and statistically signicant at the 1% level for the PFH measure of the umd portfolio.
This reects the sensitivity of PFH to rare disasters and the existence of a large loss
for the umd portfolio.
5.4. Application III: private vs. public equity
In our next illustration of the performance indices, we compare the performance
of private and public equity. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) provide a
thorough comparison of the performance of public vs. private equity investment
from the point of view of individual investors. They nd that the returns to private
equity are not higher than those of public equity, when accounting for survival. This
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result is puzzling since private equity investments expose investors to a high level
of idiosyncratic risk. They observe that private equity investment is right skewed
and conjecture that preference for skewness may be one reason for the tendency of
individuals to invest in private equity.
The performance indices used in this paper account for all moments of the dis-
tribution (skewness in particular). We thus use the indices to explore whether the
right skewness of private equity indeed compensates for its otherwise unattractive
performance. Our method follows Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Using
data on individual household investment in private equity from the 2004 Survey of
Consumer Finance (SCF), we estimate excess returns obtained by households since
the founding or the acquisition of a private rm. These are the returns they would
achieve by borrowing at the risk-free rate and investing in the private rm. We con-
sider only private rms in which a household has its largest actively managed equity
position. We treat each household as an observation and estimate the average annual
holding period return. We disregard observations with a holding period of less than
one year. The average annual holding return is calculated as the sum of the geometric
average annual capital gain and the current dividend return, which is assumed to be
representative of those in previous years. While the former can be estimated from the
initial and current market value of the ownership share, the latter is computed from
the earnings in the year prior to the survey and the current market value of equity
assuming that 30% of earnings are retained in the rm. Finally, we subtract the
risk-free rate from the estimated holding period return to obtain the average annual
excess return. Notice that similar to Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), our
sample is conditional on survival of the private rms, yielding an upward bias in the
evaluation of private equity performance.
For the purpose of comparison, we compute for each household the geometric
average annual return it would obtain by investing in the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted market index for the same time period as its
private equity holdings. As before, we subtract the risk-free rate to get the excess
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return. Fig. 3 shows the distributions of private and public equity. For the sake
of plotting the private equity histogram, we winsorize the excess returns at 200%.
Importantly, we do not winsorize the data in any of our analyses, since extreme events
are key to our results. In line with the results of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), the gures suggest that private equity returns are much more dispersed and
right skewed compared to public equity.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the moments for the private and public equity returns.
The average return on private equity conditional on survival is about 35 times larger
than that of public equity, and the di¤erence is signicant at the 1% level. However,
private equity is also extremely more volatile. In addition, the third moment of
private equity is much larger than that of public equity, but it also exhibits much
heavier tails as reected in the fourth moment. Overall, based on these four moments,
it is not clear a priori which of the two dominates.
Panel B of Table 6 provides the calculations of the performance indices. The
Sharpe ratio of private equity is signicantly lower than that of public equity. That
is, the superior average returns of private equity are outweighed by their high volatil-
ity. The question is whether the high-moment properties of private equity make it
attractive [as conjectured by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)]. The answer
provided by PAS and PFH is negative. Both measures are signicantly higher for
public equity as opposed to private equity, even when conditioning on survival. The
right skewness of private equity is not su¢ cient to compensate for its other moments.
In other words, the private equity premium puzzle suggested by Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) does not seem to be resolved by high-moment properties.
5.5. Application IV: active vs. passive mutual funds
In the next illustration of the indices we compare the performance of actively
managed equity funds and index equity funds. There is a long-lasting debate on the
value of active as opposed to passive management of mutual funds (e.g., Jensen, 1968;
Henriksson, 1984; Chang and Lewellen, 1984; Ippolito, 1989; Malkiel, 1995; Wermers,
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2000). The focus of this research is on the rst and second moments, i.e., on whether
active management beats the average returns of passive management accounting for
risk, as traditionally perceived. Given that investors care about all moments of the
return distribution, we extend the analysis to account for those moments using the
new performance measures.
To examine this issue we obtain mutual fund return data from CRSP. This data
set includes the past records of all open-ended mutual funds in existence, and is thus
free of survivorship bias. The returns we use are net of fees. We also obtain mutual
fund identication data from the Mutual Fund Links (MFLinks) data set maintained
by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Our sample period for this analysis
is January 1991 to December 2009.11
The MFLinks data provide a reliable means to join the CRSP Mutual Fund data
to equity holdings information. In practice, an investment company may run di¤erent
portfolios that have the same composition but serve di¤erent groups of investors. Such
portfolios are treated as separate funds in CRSP as noted in Wermers (2000). The
MFLinks allows us to combine all these portfolios and treat them as one mutual fund.
To evaluate the performance of actively managed funds, we drop all index funds
(including index-based and enhanced index funds), bond funds, and balanced funds
and keep only the actively managed equity funds. Also excluded from our analysis
are funds investing in foreign securities and sector funds that invest in particular
industries, such as utilities and real estate. Similarly, we obtain a sample of index
equity funds by dropping all actively managed funds, bond funds, balanced funds,
foreign funds, and sector funds.12 We then compute for each month during the sample
period the value-weighted average return of all actively managed funds and index
funds, and we subtract the risk-free rate to obtain excess returns (228 observations
overall).
11We begin our sample in 1991 since before that time, we do not have accurate information
distinguishing between index funds and actively managed funds.
12 In our sample of index funds, we do not include index-based and enhanced index funds. Including
those in the analysis does not change the results materially and the conclusions are una¤ected.
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Panel A of Table 7 reports summary statistics for both groups. It can be seen that
all four moments are very similar for the active and passive funds, and the di¤erences
between them are not statistically signicant. Panel B reports the Sharpe ratio and
the PAS and PFH indices. Here again, we do not see signicant di¤erences across the
two fund groups, consistent with the similar moments reported in Panel A. Thus, the
PAS and PFH indices lead to the conclusion that after-fee returns of active and index
funds are not distinguishable, even after accounting for high moments. This result
reinforces the view that active management does not improve overall performance of
mutual funds. In fact, we nd that not only is overall performance not a¤ected by
active management, but also each of the rst four return distribution moments are
not a¤ected by active management.
6. Mutual fund selection based on the performance in-
dices
So far we have illustrated how the new indices can be used to evaluate the per-
formance of investments. In this section we take one step forward and examine the
performance of investments selected based on the new indices out of sample. The
idea is that if the high-moment properties of investment portfolios are persistent,
then portfolios sorted on historical AS and FH measures would exhibit superior per-
formance in the future. To this end, we use the new performance indices to select
mutual funds on a monthly basis, and then examine the outcome of such an invest-
ment strategy.
Our data for this exercise consist of monthly returns of all mutual funds from
CRSP and identication data from MFLinks. We focus on a sample period covering
576 months from January 1962 through December 2009. The original CRSP data
set covers 44,093 funds. We drop all index funds, bond funds, and balanced funds
and keep only the actively managed equity funds. We also exclude foreign funds and
sector funds. This leaves us with 15,580 actively managed mutual funds that invest
in domestic equity securities. After combining duplicate funds using the MFLinks
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data we are left with 3,222 unique funds.
Our aim is to examine the performance of mutual-fund portfolios selected based
on the new indices as compared to those selected based on a traditional measure (the
Sharpe ratio). In each month during our sample period starting from January 1967
and for each mutual fund, we calculate the PAS , PFH indices and the Sharpe ratio
(S) based on the most recent 60 monthly excess returns assigning equal probability
(1=60) to each observation. If a fund does not have complete records for the preceding
60 months, or if the average return is not positive during that period, we disregard
it for that particular month.13 We then rank all mutual funds in each month based
on their indices (separately for PAS , PFH ; and S). This yields three portfolios of
selectedmutual funds consisting of equal-weighted combinations of the top decile
mutual funds. We rebalance these portfolios on a monthly basis.
Panel A of Table 8 compares various moments for the portfolio excess returns
obtained by adopting the three portfolios described above (denoted for brevity by
AS, FH, and S), as well as for the market (denoted by MKT, and represented by the
CRSP value-weighted index). For each of the four portfolios the table reports return
distribution moments estimated using GMM.
The average return (1) appears highest for portfolio S (0.54%), which was con-
structed based on Sharpe ratios. Indeed, the average returns on the AS and FH
portfolios are estimated at 0.50% and 0.47%, respectively, and the average return on
the market is estimated at 0.43%. However, the di¤erences are insignicant in most
cases. By contrast, higher moments generated by the AS and FH indices are signif-
icantly more appealing than those generated by the Sharpe ratio and are also often
more appealing than those generated by the market. Consider rst the second central
moment (m2): The estimated values for the AS and FH portfolios are 16.2 and 15.7,
respectively. Those are signicantly lower than the estimates for the S and MKT
portfolios, which are 21.2 and 21.4, respectively. Now, consider the third central
13Recall that the PAS and PFH measures as well as the Sharpe ratio can be calculated only if the
average return is positive. In some cases following very bad years, this prevents us from calculating
the measures for some funds over a 60-month period.
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moment (m3): Its estimates for the AS and FH portfolios are -37.3 and -37.0, respec-
tively, as opposed to -59.1 and -55.6 for the S and market portfolios, respectively,
with the di¤erence being signicant when compared to the S portfolio. Thus, the AS
and FH indices appear to generate less negatively skewed returns compared to the S
portfolio. Finally, both the AS and the FH portfolios generate a signicantly lower
fourth central moment (m4) compared to both the S and MKT portfolios. Thus, the
AS and FH portfolios seem to present investors with a lower tail-risk when compared
to the market or the Sharpe ratio-based portfolios.
The two performance indices estimated for the four di¤erent portfolios (reported
in Panel B) encapsulate all the information contained in high moments. Indeed, both
PAS and PFH are higher for the AS and FH portfolios compared to S and MKT
portfolios, where the di¤erence is statistically signicant in most cases. Interestingly,
portfolio S, which is composed based on the Sharpe ratio, has a lower Sharpe ratio
compared to the AS and FH portfolios, though the di¤erences are not statistically
signicant.
As before, we also calculate the certainty equivalent obtained from investing in
each one of these portfolios through the eyes of a CRRA investor with several levels of
risk aversion. Suppose, for instance, that the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient is equal
to 5. Then, the results suggest that borrowing at the risk-free rate and investing
in the AS and FH portfolios are equivalent to certain 0.07% and 0.05% monthly
gains, respectively. In comparison, borrowing at the risk-free rate and investing
in the S and MKT portfolios are equivalent to certain -0.03% and -0.15% monthly
losses, respectively. Generally, the certainty equivalent generated by the AS and FH
portfolios is higher than that generated by the S portfolio and the market. The
di¤erences become more signicant as the risk aversion coe¢ cient becomes larger.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we explore two measures of performance, PAS and PFH ; based on a
reinterpretation of two riskiness measures proposed by Aumann and Serrano (2008)
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and Foster and Hart (2009). We extend these indices to multi-period investments and
investigate their moment properties. We establish that they reect all distribution
moments in a manner consistent with economic intuition and with the asset pricing
literature. Namely, they are increasing in mean and skewness and decreasing in
variance and tail-risk of the investment return. We also discuss the way these two
indices reect disaster risk.
We then apply these indices to popular investment strategies and to well-known
anomalies. We rst nd that the momentum strategy, which is often considered the
most serious and hard to explain deviation from market e¢ ciency, is not an attrac-
tive investment strategy according to our performance measures due to unattractive
higher moments. Then we show that even after accounting for higher moments, pri-
vate equity investments are dominated by public equity. Hence, the private equity
premium puzzle suggested by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) is not re-
solved by high-moment properties. Furthermore, we apply these measures to the
comparison of actively managed equity funds and index funds and nd that the new
performance indices reinforce the view that active management does not improve
investment performance.
Finally, we examine whether the new performance measures are helpful with con-
structing investment strategies. Specically, we compare the performance of portfo-
lios of mutual funds selected based on the two indices to the market portfolio and
to a portfolio selected based on the Sharpe ratio. We nd that the PAS and PFH
indices give rise to portfolios with moments more appealing than the market portfolio
and the portfolio generated by the Sharpe ratio, and that they also produce lower
disaster risk.
The measures introduced by Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart
(2009) appear to be very useful for evaluating both risk and performance. Future
research will likely further explore the implications of these measures for asset pricing,
portfolio selection, and for dynamic decision making under risk. Such an approach is
consistent with the recent trend in asset pricing of departing from traditional utility
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functions, and accounting for higher distribution moments and rare disasters.
Appendix A
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4. We rst prove the following lemma, which gener-
alizes Proposition 2 in Hart (2011) to a multi-period setting.
Lemma 1. Let U1 and U2 be two time separable utility functions with u1 (w) and
u2 (w) being the associated utility per period. Let Au1 (w) and Au2 (w) denote the
absolute risk aversion coe¢ cients of u1 and u2; respectively, and let I  (0;1) be an
interval where Au1 (w)  Au2 (w) for every w 2 I: Then for every w0 > 0 and g 2 GT
such that w0 + gt  I for all t = 1; 2; :::; T; if U2 rejects g at w0; then U1 also rejects
g at w0:
Proof of Lemma 1. We want to prove that if
TX
t=1
t 1E

u2
 
w0 + g
t
  u2 (w0) TX
t=1
t 1; (25)
then we have
TX
t=1
t 1E

u1
 
w0 + g
t
  u1 (w0) TX
t=1
t 1:
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in Hart (2011) that Au1 (w)  Au2 (w)
for every w 2 I if and only if there exists an increasing and concave function  such
that
u1 () =  (u2 ()) :
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Now suppose (25) is true. Then this implies
TX
t=1
t 1E

u1
 
w0 + g
t

=
TX
t=1
t 1E

 
 
u2
 
w0 + g
t


TX
t=1
t 1 
 
E

u2
 
w0 + g
t

(by Jensens inequality)
=
TX
q=1
q 1
"
TX
t=1
t 1PT
q=1 
q 1 
 
E

u2
 
w0 + g
t
#

TX
q=1
q 1 
 
TX
t=1
t 1PT
q=1 
q 1E

u2
 
w0 + g
t
!
(by Jensens inequality)

TX
q=1
q 1 
 
u2 (w0)
PT
t=1 
t 1PT
q=1 
q 1
!
(from (25))
=
TX
t=1
t 1 (u2 (w0))
= u1 (w0)
TX
t=1
t 1;
as stated.
The existence and uniqueness of the solution follow from the proofs of Theorem
A in Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Theorem 1 in Foster and Hart (2009), respec-
tively. The proofs for the correspondence with wealth-uniform and utility-uniform
dominance are similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Hart (2011) with the reference
to Proposition 2 in Hart (2011) replaced by Lemma 1 established above. For brevity
we do not repeat the details here.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proofs for the two measures are parallel. Hence, for
brevity we only present the proof for the PAS measure. We begin with the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. For any g =
 
g1; g2
 2 G2 and P = PAS or P = PFH ; we have
min

P
 
g1

; P
 
g2
	  P (g)  maxP  g1 ; P  g2	 with equalities holding if and
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only if P
 
g1

= P
 
g2

:
Proof of Lemma 2. As mentioned above, we only present the proof for the PAS
measure. For any p > 0 and g 2 G, let
fAS(p; g)  E[exp( pg)]  1: (26)
Then (8) with T = 2 can be rewritten as
FAS
 
PAS (g) ; g1; g2
  fAS(PAS (g) ; g1) + fAS(PAS (g) ; g2) = 0: (27)
If PAS
 
g1

= PAS
 
g2

; then by choosing PAS (g) = PAS
 
g1

= PAS
 
g2

one can
easily verify that (27) holds. Thus, by uniqueness we have that PAS (g) = PAS
 
g1

=
PAS
 
g2

:
Now consider the case in which PAS
 
g1
 6= PAS  g2 : By the proof of Theorem
A in Aumann and Serrano (2008), we know that fAS(; gt) single-crosses zero at
PAS
 
gt

from below for t = 1; 2: That is, fAS(p; gt) < 0 for any p < PAS
 
gt

; and
fAS(p; gt) > 0 for any p > PAS
 
gt

:
If PAS (g)  minPAS  g1 ; PAS  g2	 ; then fAS(PAS (g) ; gt)  0 for both
t = 1; 2 with at least one inequality being strict. This contradicts (27). If PAS (g) 
max

PAS
 
g1

; PAS
 
g2
	
; then fAS(p; gt)  0 for both t = 1; 2 with at least one
inequality being strict, which again contradicts (27). Therefore, we must have
min

PAS
 
g1

; PAS
 
g2
	
< PAS (g) < max

PAS
 
g1

; PAS
 
g2
	
:
Now, implicitly di¤erentiating (27) yields
@PAS (g)
@
=   @F
AS=@
@FAS=@PAS (g)
=  f
AS(PAS (g) ; g2)
@FAS=@PAS (g)
:
Similar to the one-period case, FAS(; g1; g2) crosses zero at PAS (g) from below.
Hence, we have
@FAS
@PAS (g)
> 0:
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By Lemma 2, the sign of fAS(PAS (g) ; g2) is equal to the sign of PAS
 
g1
  
PAS
 
g2

:14 Hence, the sign of @P
AS(g)
@ is equal to the sign of P
AS
 
g2
  PAS  g1 :
Proof of Proposition 6. We provide the proof for the rst part of the proposition
and for the case that k is an odd number. The proof of all the other cases is similar.
For any p > 0 and g 2 G, dene
fAS(p; g)  E[exp( pg)]  1 =
1X
n=1
( 1)n
n!
pnn (g) :
By the proof of Theorem A in Aumann and Serrano (2008), we know that fAS(; g)
single-crosses zero at p = PAS (g) > 0 from below.
Now, suppose that g; g0 2 G such that k(g) > k(g0). Since k is odd, the
coe¢ cient of k (g) in f
AS(p; g) is negative. Hence,
fAS(p; g) < fAS(p; g0) (28)
for all p > 0. By Eq. (12) we know that
fAS(PAS(g); g) = 0: (29)
Then, by (28) and (29) we have
0 = fAS(PAS(g); g) < fAS(PAS(g); g0):
Since fAS(; g0) single-crosses zero at PAS(g0) from below; it must be that PAS (g0) <
PAS (g) :
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 8. The composite gamble g converges in distribution to
g0 as  goes to zero. Hence, by Proposition 10 in Foster and Hart (2009, p. 810),
lim!0 PFH (g) = 1=L:
14 If PAS
 
g1

< PAS
 
g2

; we know from Lemma 2 that PAS (g) < PAS
 
g2

: Since fAS(; g2)
crosses zero at PAS
 
g2

from below, we have fAS(PAS (g) ; g2) < 0: The other case is parallel.
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Proof of Proposition 9. We rst prove the result for the PAS measure. For any
given  2 [0; 1] ; let
hAS () = RAS (g1 + (1  ) g2) ;
where RAS () is the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index. According to Aumann and
Serrano (2008), RAS () is subadditive and homogeneous of degree 1, which together
implies that RAS () is a convex risk measure. That is, 8 2 [0; 1] we have
RAS (g1 + (1  ) g2)  RAS (g1) + (1  )RAS (g2) :
This in turn implies that hAS () is a convex function.
On the other hand, according to the continuity property of RAS [see Section
V.D of Aumann and Serrano (2008)], when n ! , RAS (ng1 + (1  n) g2) !
RAS (g1 + (1  ) g2) : This follows because ng1+(1  n) g2 is a uniformly bounded
sequence of gambles converging in distribution to g1 + (1  ) g2: This implies that
hAS () is continuous on [0; 1] : Since a continuous convex function on a bounded do-
main must have a unique global minimum, there exists a unique ^AS 2 [0; 1] that
minimizes hAS () : Since RAS () is positive, and
PAS (g1 + (1  ) g2) = 1
RAS (g1 + (1  ) g2) =
1
hAS ()
;
we have that the same ^AS maximizes PAS (g1 + (1  ) g2) :
The proof for the PFH measure is similar with the only di¤erence being in the
continuity property. According to Proposition 3 in Foster and Hart (2009), the con-
tinuity of RFH () requires not only convergence in distribution but also convergence
of the maximal loss for uniformly bounded sequences of gambles. It is clear when
n ! ; the maximal loss of ng1 + (1  n) g2 converges to that of g1 + (1  ) g2,
which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 10. Since y is independent of g; it is immediate that when
u () exhibits CARA, v (;u; y) also exhibits CARA with the same absolute risk aver-
sion. Hence, if we show that DARA is maintained when adding background risk, the
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results of Proposition 1 remain unchanged when applied to the class UD of DARA util-
ity functions allowing for additive background risk. To see this, suppose u () 2 UD.
We will show that v (;u; y) 2 UD for any additive background risk y:
Let Au (w) and Av (w) denote the absolute risk aversion coe¢ cients of u () and
v (;u; y) ; respectively, i.e.,
Au (w) =  u
00 (w)
u0 (w)
;
and
Av (w) =  v
00 (w;u; y)
v0 (w;u; y)
=  E [u
00 (w + y)]
E [u0 (w + y)]
:
Since u () 2 UD; we know
A0u (w) =
[u00 (w)]2   u000 (w)u0 (w)
[u0 (w)]2
 0;
which implies 
u00 (w)
2  u000 (w)u0 (w) : (30)
Now,
A0v (w) =
(E [u00 (w + y)])2  E [u000 (w + y)]E [u0 (w + y)]
(E [u0 (w + y)])2
(31)

(E [u00 (w + y)])2  

E
hp
u000 (w + y)u0 (w + y)
i2
(E [u0 (w + y)])2
;
where the inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.15 By (30), we have
that for all realizations of y;
 u00 (w + y) 
p
u000 (w + y)u0 (w + y);
where the negative sign on the left-hand side results from the concavity of u () :
Taking expectation on both sides yields
 E u00 (w + y)  E hpu000 (w + y)u0 (w + y)i ;
which in turn implies 
E

u00 (w + y)
2  E hpu000 (w + y)u0 (w + y)i2 : (32)
15Note that by DARA, u000  0; implying that the term under the radical is non-negative.
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Hence, from (31) and (32) we obtain A0v (w)  0: This completes the proof of the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 11. It is immediate that when u (w) = logw; then a mul-
tiplicative background risk results in adding a constant to utility, and thus does not
change the form of the utility function. Namely, log utility can be written in the form
v (;u; z) = E [u (w (1 + z))] for some u 2 UI : By Remark (1) in Hart (2011, p. 637),
if we can show that for any u 2 UI we have v (;u; z) 2 UI ; then the results of Propo-
sition 2 remain unchanged when applied to the class UI ; allowing for multiplicative
background risk. To see this, let u () 2 UI , and consider a multiplicative background
risk 1 + z:
Let Ru (w) and Rv (w) denote the relative risk aversion coe¢ cients of u () and
v (;u; z) ; respectively, i.e.,
Ru (w) =  wu
00 (w)
u0 (w)
;
and
Rv (w) =  wv
00 (w;u; z)
v0 (w;u; z)
=  w
E
h
(1 + z)2 u00 (w (1 + z))
i
E [(1 + z)u0 (w (1 + z))]
:
Since u () 2 UI ; we know that
  (w (1 + z)) u
00 (w (1 + z))
u0 (w (1 + z))
 1
for any z: Equivalently, after multiplying by 1 + z  0;
 

w (1 + z)2

u00 (w (1 + z))  (1 + z)u0 (w (1 + z)) :
Taking expectations on both sides with respect to z gives
 w
E
h
(1 + z)2 u00 (w (1 + z))
i
E [(1 + z)u0 (w (1 + z))]
 1:
That is, Rv (w)  1 as needed.
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Table 1 Motivating example I
This table provides an example in which the Sharpe ratio fails to capture the high-moment and rare
disaster properties of the distribution of gambles, leading to an inconsistency with SOSD. Two gambles
g1 and g2 are being compared, with the gamble value and the corresponding probability and cumulative
distribution function (CDF ) reported. The table also reports the various moments of the two gambles, where
1 denotes the rst moment, and m2, m3, and m4 stand for the second, third, and fourth central moments,
respectively. The table also reports the Sharpe ratios of the gambles, denoted by S.
g1 g2
Value Probability CDF Value Probability CDF
-10 0.001 0.001 -1 0.001 0.001
1 0.999 1 1 0.9 0.901
4 0.099 1
1 0.989 1.295
m2 0.121 0.808
m3 -1.327 1.924
m4 14.583 5.335
S 2.845 1.441
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Table 2 Motivating example II
This table provides an example in which the Sharpe ratio fails to capture the high-moment properties
of the distribution of gambles, leading to an inconsistency with SOSD. Two gambles g1 and g2 are being
compared, with the gamble value and the corresponding probability and CDF reported. The table also
reports the various moments of the two gambles, where 1 denotes the rst moment, and m2, m3, and m4
stand for the second, third, and fourth central moments, respectively. The table also reports the Sharpe ratios
of the gambles, denoted by S.
g1 g2
Value Probability CDF Value Probability CDF
-1 0.001 0.001 -1 0.001 0.001
1 0.999 1 1 0.9 0.901
4 0.099 1
1 0.998 1.295
m2 0.004 0.808
m3 -0.008 1.924
m4 0.016 5.335
S 15.788 1.441
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Table 4 Optimal combinations of anomalies
This table illustrates the pairwise optimal convex combinations of the market excess return (mktrf),
and the small-minus-big (smb), high-minus-low (hml), and up-minus-down (umd) portfolios using monthly
returns in percentage points for the period January 1962 to December 2009. Panels A and B report the results
for the PAS and PFH measures, respectively. For each pair of portfolios, the table shows the maximal PAS
and PFH values delivered by the optimal convex combination, with the associated weights assigned to the
two portfolios reported below in parentheses.
Panel A: PAS measure
mktrf smb hml umd
mktrf 0:0659 0:1941 0:1232
(0.35,0.65) (0.33,0.67) (0.46,0.54)
smb 0:2006 0:1304
(0.43,0.57) (0.57,0.43)
hml 0:1933
(0.68,0.32)
umd
Panel B: PFH measure
mktrf smb hml umd
mktrf 0:0606 0:1103 0:0685
(0.31,0.69) (0.38,0.62) (0.44,0.56)
smb 0:1540 0:0802
(0.54,0.46) (0.56,0.44)
hml 0:1143
(0.84,0.16)
umd
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Table 5 High-moment and rare disaster properties of momentum portfolio
This table illustrates the high-moment and rare disaster properties of the momentum (umd) portfolio,
based on the monthly umd returns in percentage points for the period January 1962 to December 2009. The
results for the umd portfolio are reported in column 1. In comparison, we draw one million samples of the same
size from a simulated normal distribution with mean and variance equal to those of the sample momentum
returns. The results for the simulated distribution are reported in column 2. In addition, di¤erence test
results are reported in column 3. Panel A shows estimates of various moments of the portfolio returns, where
1 denotes the rst moment, and m2, m3, and m4 stand for the second, third, and fourth central moments,
respectively. Panel B reports the Sharpe ratio (S) and the Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart performance
indices (PAS and PFH): Further, Panel B also reports the certainty equivalent (CE) of a risk-averse investor
with CRRA utility and a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3, 5, or 10, assuming that the initial wealth and the
investment scale are equal. Bootstrapped t -statistics are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding
estimates. Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Panel A: Various moments
(1) (2) (3)
umd Simulated umd-Simulated
1 0.7257 0.7257 0.0001
(4.02)*** (96.32)*** (0.00)
m2 18.7827 18.7504 0.0323
(6.73)*** (407.23)*** (0.01)
m3 -116.1113 -0.0026 -116.1086
(-1.47) (-0.01) (-1.47)
m4 4,862.86 1,054.80 3,808.06
(1.74)* (176.42)*** (1.36)
Panel B: Performance comparison
(1) (2) (3)
umd Simulated umd-Simulated
S 0.1675 0.1678 -0.0003
(-0.01)
PAS 0.0630 0.0777 -0.0147
(-0.63)
PFH 0.0288 0.0674 -0.0386
(-2.94)***
CE ( = 3) 0.4071 0.4450 -0.0379
(-0.17)
CE ( = 5) 0.1379 0.2566 -0.1186
(-0.43)
CE ( = 10) -1.0615 -0.2192 -0.8424
(-1.04)
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Table 6 Private vs. public equity
This table compares the performance of private (column 1) and public (column 2) equity. The private
equity performance is evaluated based on entrepreneur-level returns constructed from the 2004 Survey of
Consumer Finance (SCF). This sample is conditional on survival, yielding an upward bias in the evaluation
of private equity performance. The public equity returns are proxied by returns to the CRSP value-weighted
market index. The di¤erence test results are reported in column 3. Panel A shows GMM estimates of
various moments of the equity returns, where 1 denotes the rst moment, and m2, m3, and m4 stand for
the second, third, and fourth central moments, respectively. Panel B reports the Sharpe ratio (S) and the
Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart performance indices (PAS and PFH): Further, Panel B also reports the
certainty equivalent (CE) of a risk-averse investor with CRRA utility and a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3 or 5,
assuming that the initial wealth and the investment scale are equal. We are not able to compute the certainty
equivalent for a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 10 since then, investing in private equity is almost equivalent to
losing the entire initial wealth for sure, rendering the calculations computationally impossible. The t -statistics
are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates. Asterisks denote statistical signicance
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Panel A: Various moments
(1) (2) (3)
Private Public Private-Public
1 196.5432 5.5895 190.9537
(5.26)*** (92.12)*** (5.11)***
m2 6:1506 106 16.2216 6:1505 106
(1.90)* (23.29)*** (1.90)*
m3 5:1344 1011 73.0088 5:1344 1011
(1.75)* (8.58)*** (1.75)*
m4 4:6177 1016 2,400.33 4:6177 1016
(1.74)* (15.69)*** (1.74)*
Panel B: Performance comparison
(1) (2) (3)
Private Public Private-Public
S 0.0793 1.3878 -1.3086
(-45.96)***
PAS 0.0549 0.7971 -0.7422
(-38.18)***
PFH 0.0100 0.2583 -0.2483
(-4,293,137)***
CE ( = 3) -70.3273 5.3536 -75.6808
(-12.04)***
CE ( = 5) -94.4017 5.2129 -99.6146
(-156.16)***
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Table 7 Active vs. passive funds
This table compares the performance of actively managed (column 1) and index (column 2) funds, based
on the CRSP mutual fund return data for the time period January 1991 to December 2009. The di¤erence
test results are reported in column 3. Panel A shows GMM estimates of various moments of the fund returns,
where 1 denotes the rst moment, and m2, m3, and m4 stand for the second, third, and fourth central
moments, respectively. Panel B reports the Sharpe ratio (S) and the Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart
performance indices (PAS and PFH): Further, Panel B also reports the certainty equivalent (CE) of a risk-
averse investor with CRRA utility and a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3, 5, or 10, assuming that the initial wealth
and the investment scale are equal. The t -statistics are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding
estimates. Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Panel A: Various moments
(1) (2) (3)
Active Passive Active-Passive
1 0.5210 0.5409 -0.0199
(1.79)* (1.88)* (-0.30)
m2 19.2097 18.9356 0.2741
(7.90)*** (8.08)*** (0.44)
m3 -67.3233 -58.9134 -8.4099
(-2.24)** (-2.17)** (-1.38)
m4 1,718.30 1,610.39 107.91
(2.81)*** (2.96)*** (0.97)
Panel B: Performance comparison
(1) (2) (3)
Active Passive Active-Passive
S 0.1189 0.1243 -0.0054
(-0.37)
PAS 0.0508 0.0537 -0.0029
(-0.49)
PFH 0.0441 0.0465 -0.024
(-0.64)
CE ( = 3) 0.2175 0.2435 -0.0260
(-0.40)
CE ( = 5) -0.0014 0.0307 -0.0321
(-0.50)
CE ( = 10) -0.6240 -0.5665 -0.0575
(-0.81)
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Fig. 1. Distributions of anomaly returns.
This gure shows the histograms of the monthly market excess return (mktrf), and the monthly returns
of the small-minus-big (smb), high-minus-low (hml), and up-minus-down (umd) portfolios for the period
January 1962 to December 2009.
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Fig. 2. Distributions of momentum and simulated normal returns.
This gure compares the histogram of the monthly returns of the momentum (umd) portfolio against
the histogram of a simulated normal distribution with the same mean and variance for the period January
1962 to December 2009.
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Fig. 3. Distributions of private and public equity returns.
This gure compares the histograms of the average annual holding period excess returns from private
versus public equity investments. The private equity returns are estimated at the entrepreneur level based
on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). This sample is conditional on survival, and the returns are
winsorized at 200%. The public equity returns are proxied by returns to the CRSP value-weighted market
index for each household during the same time period as its private equity holdings.
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